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Abstract
This study examines how people manage uncertain competitive social
interactions. To achieve positive interaction outcomes, individuals may
engage in a social perception process that leads them to believe they
have obtained more information about others than these others gained
about them. We investigate how asymmetric knowledge perceptions
contribute to important aspects of negotiation, namely rapport building
among strangers and egocentric beliefs about fairness of resource distri-
bution. In Study 1, dyads completed measures of knowledge acquisition
and partner evaluation after a rapport-building exercise. Results showed
that individuals believed they gained more information about their part-
ner than vice versa; notably, the magnitude of this knowledge bias was
associated with more positive partner evaluations. Study 2 showed that
the magnitude of the knowledge bias predicted lower egocentrism in a
commons dilemma task. Together, these results suggest knowledge
asymmetries facilitate rapport among strangers and may have important
implications for cooperation in competitive negotiation settings.
Negotiation researchers have long been interested in how social relationship processes can facilitate
positive negotiation outcomes (e.g., Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Valley, Neale,
& Mannix, 1995). However, what makes building rapport among negotiators challenging is that negotia-
tion is a mixed-motive undertaking in which negotiators are motivated to cooperate with one another to
reach an agreement but also simultaneously compete to claim resources (Kopelman, 2014; Lax & Sebe-
nius, 1986; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Thus, negotiation contexts represent a social setting in which
people deal with uncertainty—for example, not knowing the other’s motives, the degree to which they
are cooperative or competitive, whether they are trustworthy, or whether they are interested in building
a long-term relationship.
The uncertainty inherent to negotiation contexts can pose a threat to one’s sense of control over the
social environment (cf. Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976) and produce anxiety (e.g., Page-
Gould, Mendoza-Denton, & Tropp, 2008; Rosette, Kopelman, & Abbot, 2014; Stephan & Stephan,
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1985). In addition, when people are uncertain about the interaction partner’s intentions, they may be less
inclined to reveal information about themselves to guard against possible exploitation (cf. Stephan &
Stephan, 1985). For example, when people expect to interact with a competitive (vs. cooperative) stran-
ger, they prefer to be unpredictable, are less willing to open up, and are more willing to mislead the other
(Rios, Ybarra, & Sanchez-Burks, 2013; Ybarra et al., 2010). Because of the uncertainty, it is no surprise
that negotiators tend to be egocentric (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992), overweighing views that favor
themselves and interpreting fairness from their own point of view (Babcock & Olson, 1992; Camerer &
Loewenstein, 1993; De Dreu & McCusker, 1997; Diekmann, 1997; Messick & Sentis, 1979).
Given the challenge of managing uncertainty inherent to many negotiation situations and keeping
negotiations from sliding into purely distributive competitive interactions, it is important to determine
the factors that influence the building of rapport—a critical factor to creating positive negotiation out-
comes. Thus, the question we studied in this research is as follows: How do people mentally approach
their interactions with unknown others to achieve more positive interactions and negotiation outcomes?
This article investigated whether biased perceptions of knowledge acquisition (between self and other)
could lead to positive evaluations of that person (Study 1), and whether the degree to which individuals
displayed this tendency influenced beliefs about fair distribution of resources in negotiations (Study 2).
Relationships help people attain resources that would otherwise remain elusive and meet fundamental
needs that would otherwise go unfulfilled (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Baumeister & Leary, 1995;
Bowlby, 1969; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Maslow, 1968). Thus, people are generally motivated to develop
friendships with others, many times in the service of establishing reciprocal relationships (Trivers, 1971).
Although relationships are central to the human survival strategy, a fundamental question persists about
how smooth interactions and negotiations among strangers unfold when uncertainty, wariness, and the
possibility of exploitation loom in their minds. This matter becomes particularly problematic when peo-
ple feel exposed to others with whom long-term social connection is uncertain, for example, a meeting
or negotiation between strangers (Clark & Chrisman, 1994; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989;
Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Ybarra, 2002).
Potentially related to the above conundrum social actors face wanting relationships but seeking to
protect the self are findings indicating that people express a pervasive motive to obtain information
about their social worlds (Dunning, 2001; Ybarra, 2002) and reduce social uncertainty (Berger &
Calabrese, 1975). Thus, one psychological process that may help in managing uncertain social interac-
tions—such as interactions involving strangers or unknown parties in a negotiation—and make them
unfold more smoothly could involve people believing they have obtained information about others
during interaction. Some research has shown, for example, that information sharing among team
members can enhance group cohesion and performance (for a review, see Mesmer-Magnus & De-
Church, 2009). Other research indicates that people like others who have disclosed to them (Berg &
Archer, 1983; Collins & Miller, 1994; Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991; Vittengl & Holt, 2000). But an
independent process that may be masked in these studies is individuals’ concerns with sharing too
much information about themselves in uncertain social interactions.
Thus, in addition to being motivated to gain an understanding about others, and even being com-
pelled to reciprocate disclosures, individuals may nevertheless seek to limit how much the other parties
learn about them to reduce the chances of exploitation (Rios et al., 2013; Ybarra et al., 2010). This has
implications for the evaluation of others, as interacting with strangers involves uncertainty (e.g., about
that person’s character and intentions), which is associated with reduced interpersonal control and nega-
tive interpersonal attitudes (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005; Turner, Crisp, &
Lambert, 2007). Therefore, assessments of how much information a person believes they have gained in
an interaction are important to consider with regard to the same individual’s perceptions about what the
other party learned about them, controlling for level of mutual disclosure.
Beliefs about knowledge gained by the self versus other can be conceptualized as an asymmetry.
Research has shown, for example, that the knowledge perception process tends to be biased in favor of
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the actor. For example, work on the illusion of asymmetric insight suggests that people often believe they
have gained more information about an interaction partner than that partner has gained about the self
(Park, Choi, & Cho, 2006; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Pronin, Kruger, Savtisky, & Ross, 2001). None
of the research on the illusion of asymmetric insight, however, has examined the knowledge asymmetry
in relation to interpersonal and negotiation outcomes. How would a bias in knowledge perceptions that
favors the self influence negotiations?
We propose that, beyond perceptions of mutual disclosure, people can manage the uncertainty of
interacting with strangers by forming the belief that they have obtained more information about others
than those others have gained about themselves (the self). Believing that one has gained information
about others would allow perceivers to create a richer representation of these individuals (Swann & Gill,
1997) and better simulate the interaction (Crisp & Turner, 2009), processes associated with increased
interpersonal confidence and positive perceptions of others. At the same time, people want to limit expo-
sure during uncertain encounters (Ybarra et al., 2010), as overexposure can lead to anxiety (Jellison & Ic-
kes, 1974), reduced interpersonal control, and negative interpersonal attitudes (e.g., Stephan & Stephan,
1985; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005; Turner et al., 2007). Taken together, positive interpersonal outcomes
would occur to the extent that people believe they have more information about their partner than their
partner has of them. In this research, we test this hypothesis that the magnitude of the illusion of asym-
metric insight predicts positive interpersonal outcomes (Study 1: more positive evaluations of an interac-
tion partner; Study 2: lower egocentrism during negotiations).
Study 1
Study 1 examined the process by which strangers meet for the first time and build rapport, an important
phase of negotiations. Particularly, we tested whether evaluations of an interaction partner, after a brief
rapport-building exercise, were enhanced as a function of the magnitude of the illusion of asymmetric
insight. This illusion is defined from the individual’s perspective, who is making judgments for both self
and partner, and the degree to which individuals judge they obtained relatively more knowledge about
their partner (actors’ perceptions of knowledge about partner = APK) than their partner obtained about
them (actors’ perceptions of partners’ knowledge about the self = APPK). Two hypotheses guided Study
1: (a) An asymmetry in knowledge perception will emerge that favors the actor (i.e., APK will surpass
APPK), replicating previous research (Park et al., 2006; Pronin et al., 2001, 2004). Of greater interest, we
expected that (b) the higher the magnitude of the illusion, the more positive the partner evaluations. Fur-
ther, and of critical importance, we expected that the effects of the illusion of asymmetric insight on part-
ner evaluations would hold even when accounting for actors’ perceptions of mutual disclosure between
self and partner (actors’ perception of mutual disclosure = APMD, more detail below). Finally, we
expected the effects of the illusion of asymmetric insight on liking to hold even after controlling for emo-
tion felt during the interaction, which could independently influence participants’ ratings of their partner
(Bodenhausen, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 2007; Urban & Miller, 1998).
Method
Participants and Procedure
Previously unacquainted undergraduate dyads (N = 54 dyads; 57% females; age: 17–38 [M = 19.2]; 62%
Caucasian, 8% African American, 17% Asian or Asian American, 7% Latino(a)) participated in a
rapport-building exercise. This rapport-building task represented an uncertain social interaction because
participants were strangers when the study commenced. Opposite-sex dyads were permitted, as gender
composition of the dyads does not influence perceptions of knowledge acquisition between actor and
partner (Clark et al., 2004; Pronin et al., 2001).
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After being introduced to the study, participants separately generated a list of questions to ask their
partner, with instructions to “find out who [your partner] really is on the inside.” Participants were
asked to construct questions that would not (a) yield simple (e.g., yes or no) responses, (b) reveal per-
sonally identifying information, or (c) be perceived as intrusive, vulgar, or insensitive (no participant
expressed concern about the questions posed to them). Participants then convened at a center table,
where they each asked all their prepared questions in one block (i.e., they did not alternate at the conclu-
sion of each question). Once the rapport-building exercise concluded, participants separately completed
measures of perceived knowledge acquisition (for self about partner and what they thought the partner
learned about them), partner evaluation, and positive and negative affects, described below.
Two variations of the procedure, pertaining to the number of questions generated and asked, were
conducted. In the first variation, which included 21 dyads, participants generated eight questions, and
then, they were randomly assigned to either ask all eight of their questions or only three of their eight
questions (one member of each dyad asked eight questions, while the other member of the dyad asked
three). In the second variation, which included the remaining 34 dyads, no experimental assignment
occurred: Participants each generated and asked their partner five questions. Because the experimental
manipulation conducted in the first variation did not impact APK, APPK, or partner evaluation
(Fs < 2.2, ps > .15), we collapsed data from these two procedures.
Measures
Perceived knowledge acquisition (APK) was assessed with eight items using a Likert-type scale, with values
ranging from 1 = not at all to 9 = a great, great deal. The items were preceded by the following phrase:
“How much do you think you know about your partner’s. . .” These items included the following: “overall
intelligence,” “shyness in social situations,” “sincerity or honesty,” “political views,” “aspirations or
goals,” “empathy toward other people,” “knowledge of current events,” and “conceptions of what he or
she finds truly important” (a = .77). Participants also answered the same set of questions, but they did
so from the perspective of their interaction partner. These judgments served as an index of how much
information participants perceived their partner gained about them (APPK). These items were preceded
by the following phrase: “How much do you think your partner knows about your. . .” (a = .80). The
order in which participants completed the measures of APK versus APPK was counterbalanced across
sessions to preclude order effects (Schwarz, 1999). APK and APPK were positively correlated (r = .69,
p < .001).
Partner evaluation was assessed using a composite score of four items (a = .74), preceded by the
following phrase: “To what extent do you think your partner is. . .” Items included “a nice person,” “a
friendly person,” “someone with a lot of good qualities,” and “someone you feel you can easily talk to.”
Participants responded using a response scale with values ranging from 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely.
Positive and negative affects were assessed separately with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to account for the potentially confounding effect of emo-
tion. Participants, using a scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely, responded to 20 emotion adjectives
(10 positive, e.g., excited, interested, a = .86; 10 negative, e.g., upset, distressed, a = .80) pertaining to
how they felt during the interaction.
Results
Data analysis proceeded in three phases. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), conducted using the
MIXED command in SPSS (IBM Corp., 2013), was used throughout all analyses to adjust for any bias in
standard errors or statistical tests due to dyadic nonindependence (Kenny, Korchmaros, & Bolger, 2003;
Krull & MacKinnon, 2001). Because participants within dyads were indistinguishable, we specified a
compound symmetry covariance structure.
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In phase one of the analysis, we tested for potential differences in APK versus APPK, with the aim of
replicating the illusion of asymmetric insight effect. In phase two, we examined the contribution of asym-
metric APK to partner evaluation; in doing so, we sought to statistically account for APMD. Controlling
for APMD in the analyses is crucial because perceived mutual disclosure (amount of information
believed to be shared by self and other) has been shown to be a consistent predictor of partner evaluation
and positive relationships (Berg & Archer, 1983; Collins & Miller, 1994; Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991;
Vittengl & Holt, 2000). To do this, we first computed the average of APK and APPK (yielding the vari-
able APMD), which reflects the total amount of information believed to be exchanged between actor and
partner, as reported by the actor. We then subtracted APMD from the original APK variable (yielding
the variable asymmetric APK). This asymmetric APK variable reflects the amount of APK relative to the
total amount of information exchanged. In phase three, we controlled for positive and negative affects.
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for all variables.
Hierarchical linear modeling analysis revealed that APK surpassed APPK, F(1, 105.4) = 13.80,
p < .001, consistent with an illusion of asymmetric insight effect. We then simultaneously entered
APMD and asymmetric APK to predict partner evaluations (Figure 1A). HLM analysis confirmed that
APMD was positively associated with partner evaluations, B = 0.16, SE = 0.04, t(85.2) = 4.33, p < .001,
indicating that the higher the perceived mutual disclosure between the participants, the more positive
the partner evaluations. This finding is consistent with the self-disclosure literature and confirms the
necessity to control for mutual disclosure in examining the present effects. Of greater interest, the HLM
analysis revealed that asymmetric APK was also positively associated with partner evaluations, B = 0.23,
SE = 0.09, t(92.5) = 2.68, p < .01, indicating that the higher the perceived information gained by the
participants relative to their partners, the more positive the partner evaluations. This effect of asymmet-
ric APK on partner evaluations remained significant after controlling for positive affect, B = 0.24,
SE = 0.08, t(91.8) = 2.92, p < .01, and negative affect, B = 0.22, SE = 0.09, t(91.7) = 2.56, p < .05.
Discussion
Study 1 tested the role that beliefs about information gained about an interaction partner, relative to the
degree of information the partner was believed to have gained about the self, played in evaluations of
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Assessed in Studies 1 and 2
Variable M SD
Study 1
APK 4.00 1.44
APPK 3.58 1.45
APMD 3.79 1.32
Asymmetric APK (APK–APMD) 0.20 0.57
Partner evaluation 3.74 0.54
Positive affect 3.12 0.66
Negative affect 1.31 0.36
Study 2
APK 4.22 1.11
APPK 4.18 1.20
APMD 4.20 1.11
Asymmetric APK (APK–APMD) 0.02 0.34
Egocentrism (percent score) 26.9 18.2
Note. Egocentrism was subsequently z-scored by role for use in analyses.
APK, actors’ perceived knowledge; APMD, actors’ perceptions of mutual disclosure; APPK, actors’ perceptions of partner
knowledge.
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those interaction partners. Our first hypothesis was that an illusion of asymmetric knowledge acquisition
that favors the actor would emerge as previously reported (Park et al., 2006; Pronin et al., 2001, 2004).
Moreover, our second (and core) hypothesis was that the magnitude of this asymmetric insight (biased
perception) would positively relate to partner evaluations.
Both hypotheses were supported. First, and consistent with the illusion of asymmetric insight effect,
our results showed that APK surpassed APPK. Interestingly, this effect emerged despite our attempt to
manipulate knowledge perception (by varying the amount of information exchanged between the inter-
action partners), potentially reflecting the robustness of the illusion of asymmetric insight when individ-
uals meet each other. Second, our results showed that the magnitude of the illusion of asymmetric
insight (asymmetric APK) was positively associated with partner evaluations. This effect of asymmetric
APK cannot be attributed to emotion felt during the interaction, as additional analyses controlled for
positive and negative affects. Further, although people tend to like those who reciprocate disclosure (Berg
& Archer, 1983; Collins & Miller, 1994; Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991; Vittengl & Holt, 2000), control-
ling for perceived mutual disclosure (APMD) did not preclude the effect of asymmetric APK. Thus, the
amount of information that actors perceive they have obtained, relative to how much knowledge their
partner is perceived to have gathered about the actors themselves (the self), accounts for variance in part-
ner evaluations beyond that accounted for by perceptions of mutual disclosure. This outcome suggests
that the illusion of asymmetric insight may represent a process that enables individuals to build rapport
in uncertain social situations.
A
B 
Asymmetric APK
APMD
Egocentrism
-.28*
-.33**
Study 2
Asymmetric APK
APMD
Partner Evaluation
.27**
.42***
Study 1
Figure 1. Prediction of partner evaluation (Study 1; A) and egocentrism (Study 2; B) by asymmetric actors’ perceptions
of knowledge (APK relative to actors’ perceptions of partners’ knowledge) and actors’ perceptions of mutual disclosure
(APMD). The figure shows partial correlations ascertained from multiple regression analyses that were adjusted for dyadic
nonindependence (*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001).
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However, it remains to be determined whether asymmetric APK influences what people believe to be
fair resource distribution in uncertain social interactions. Study 2 investigated how the asymmetric APK
relates to lower egocentrism when negotiating over scarce resources.
Study 2
Study 2 tested the hypothesis that asymmetric APK relates to less egocentrism during an uncertain, tacit
group coordination task. The negotiation task used in Study 2 allowed us to examine the kinds of deci-
sions people make during an uncertain social interaction where exploitation could occur (a commons
dilemma) and also allowed us to extend our research question beyond dyads to small groups.
In a commons dilemma, interdependent decision-makers may tacitly negotiate to prevent complete
depletion of a scarce resource (Hardin, 1968; Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992). Commons
dilemmas reflect tacit negotiations in which direct communication or binding contracts are either diffi-
cult to achieve or illegal, and therefore, it is highly plausible that implicit psychological processes influ-
ence such social interactions (Kopelman, 2009; Schelling, 1960; Thompson, 2001). Extensive research in
social psychology and experimental economics highlights the importance of studying such implicit psy-
chological processes, which have implications for management of sustainable resources on a global scale
(Dawes, 1980; Komorita & Parks, 1994; Kopelman, 2009; Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002; Messick &
Brewer, 1983).
Study 2 focused on egocentrism, the belief that a decision-maker deserves a larger portion of the com-
mon resource (Kopelman, 2009; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996). Lower egocentrism
reflects an individual’s willingness to sacrifice personal gain for the well-being of the group and the sus-
tainability of the scarce resource. If asymmetric APK facilitates positive evaluations of others, and thus
rapport, as suggested by Study 1, then those participants with high asymmetric APK would render less
egocentric decisions because the possibility of exploitation is diminished. This perspective would align
with past research indicating that positive evaluations can serve as a simple heuristic through which
negotiators arrive at judgments (Neale & Bazerman, 1991) and that negotiators do not necessarily make
decisions based on their self-interest when negotiating with parties with whom they have high-quality
(e.g., romantic) relationships (Valley et al., 1995). Therefore, in Study 2, we hypothesized that asymmet-
ric APK would predict lower egocentrism with respect to the amount of resources people believe is fair
for them to take for themselves or their constituents.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Masters of business administration students (N = 85; 36% females; age: 22–41 [M = 28.91, SD = 3.54];
work experience: 0–20 years [M = 5.60, SD = 3.32]; 50% Asian or Asian American, 35% Caucasian, 6%
Latino(a), 4% African American, and 4% other; seven of the 92 students were missing data and excluded
from the analysis) participated in a four-person group asymmetric commons dilemma called Shark Har-
vesters and Resources Conservation (SHARC; Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996) as part of a class exercise on
negotiation. Participants role-played one of four for-profit shark fishing associations. Two roles repre-
sented commercial fishermen (large commercial [LC] and small commercial [SC]), who had relatively
high economic power, and two represented recreational fishermen (recreational competition [RC] and
recreational tours [RT]), who had relatively low economic power. Due to these economic power differ-
ences (economic power was defined as current market share and future dependence on the resource), this
task is conceptualized to be an asymmetric commons dilemma. Asymmetric commons dilemmas are
more prevalent than situations of economic power symmetry and are considered an ecologically valid
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(Murnighan, King, & Schoumaker, 1990) depiction of real-world commons dilemmas (for a review, see
Kopelman et al., 2002).
Participants received background materials that explained collective over-harvesting by the fishing
industry (LC, SC, RC, and RT) was depleting the resource (shark) faster than it could replenish (repro-
duce). Sustainability of the resource required the industry to lower the overall harvest from the current
collective harvest of 5,000 metric tons (LC = 2,000, SC = 1,500, RC = 1,000, and RT = 500) to 2,500
metric tons. The common goal for all parties was to reduce collective harvesting, while the individual
goal of each representative concerned protecting the economic well-being of his or her shark fishing asso-
ciation and its members. Participants were randomly assigned to the role of LC, SC, RC, or RT and ran-
domly assigned to one of 23 groups. Participants were allotted 30 minutes to discuss the dilemma,
during which no explicit agreements could be made regarding their intended harvest. Following this dis-
cussion, participants independently completed measures of knowledge perception and egocentrism. The
SHARC task was then debriefed.
Measures
Perceived knowledge was assessed with the same knowledge items used in Study 1 but this time using 7-
point scales. Each item was preceded by the following phrase: “How much do you think you know about
the other group members’ (other members know about your) . . .” Thus, in this study, participants reported
on their perceptions of knowledge of the collective and their perceptions of the collective’s knowledge of
them. Participants completed these knowledge ratings online and separately from their group. As in
Study 1, we computed composites of APK (a = .86) and APPK (a = .90), which again were positively
correlated (r = .83, p < .001). From these variables, we also computed indices of APMD and asymmetric
APK, following the procedures described for Study 1.
Egocentrism reflected the market share participants felt their fishing association deserved. Participants
reported what they believed represented a fair harvest for their own association and for each of the other
three associations. We calculated each association’s egocentrism score by dividing the percentage they
believed was fair for them to harvest by the total industry harvest they thought was fair. For example, if
an LC representative believed a fair solution to the commons dilemma involved reducing LC’s harvest to
1,500, SC to 700, RC to 200, and RT to 100, then the LC’s egocentrism measure would be 1,500/
(1,500 + 700 + 200 + 100) = 1,500/2,500 = 60%. Higher percentages signified higher egocentrism.
Egocentrism percentage scores were standardized by role; therefore, the z-scores reflected egocentrism
compared with other individuals assigned to represent the same association. Standardization was neces-
sary due to economic power differences and, therefore, potential differences in perceptions of fairness
among the roles.
Results
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for all Study 2 variables. HLM with a compound
symmetry covariance structure was conducted to account for group nonindependence, with participants
nested within their respective discussion group.
Study 2 analyses paralleled those for Study 1, with the exception that we did not assess positive or neg-
ative affect regarding the interaction. Although we did not observe the expected illusion of asymmetric
insight effect (i.e., APK did not surpass APPK), F(1, 84.0) = 0.26, p > .61, our primary HLM analysis, in
which APMD and asymmetric APK were entered as simultaneous predictors of egocentrism (Figure 1B),
revealed a negative association between APMD and egocentrism, B = 0.27, SE = 0.09, t(69.9) = 2.96,
p < .01. This finding indicated that the higher the perceived mutual disclosure between participants and
the collective, the lower the egocentrism displayed by the individual participants. And more pertinent to
our hypotheses, this same HLM analysis revealed a negative association between asymmetric APK and
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egocentrism as predicted, B = 0.60, SE = 0.28, t(52.4) = 2.14, p < .05. This latter finding indicated
that the higher the perceived information gained by the participants relative to the collective, the lower
the egocentrism of individual participants in their negotiation decisions.
Discussion
Consistent with our hypotheses, Study 2 results showed that asymmetric APK relates to less egocentrism
during a tacit negotiation task, indicating that participants with high scores on this asymmetric APK var-
iable were more likely to believe it would be fair to sacrifice their own self-interest for the collective inter-
ests of the group. Accordingly, the effect of asymmetric APK on task-related egocentrism extends the
results of Study 1 and is consistent with previous research suggesting that knowledge about others
decreases egocentric tendencies (Kruger, Windschitl, Burrus, Fessel, & Chambers, 2008). Study 2
extended the results of Study 1 by showing that the relation between asymmetric APK and indicators of
positive interactions (egocentrism in Study 2) also holds in small group negotiation settings and not only
during dyadic interactions.
In general, the effect of asymmetric APK contributes to an emerging understanding of the
psychological factors that enhance cooperation during commons dilemmas (Kopelman et al., 2002;
Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). Particularly, the finding that the asymmetric APK led to beliefs that
it would be fair to forgo self-interest in negotiations for the good of the group is consistent with a grow-
ing body of research emphasizing the importance of relational capital (e.g., liking, trust, quality of dyadic
relationship) among negotiating parties (De Clercq & Sapienza, 2006; Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, &
O’Brien, 2006). Our findings, for example, fit well with the idea of relational accomodation, whereby
negotiators forfeit economic outcomes, either consciously or nonconsciously, to pursue relational goals
and adhere to relational norms (Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008). Moreover, the
results are particularly interesting in light of research suggesting that power reduces perspective-taking
(Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Mannix & Neale, 1993). Ostensibly, reduced egocentrism
necessitates adopting the perspective of others who also depend on the same resource. Thus, our study
suggests that the perception of increased knowledge relative to others’ knowledge, which can be con-
strued as a form of illusory power, potentially enhanced a form of perspective-taking manifested as less
egocentrism. Future research could examine whether APK instills feelings of power, not necessarily to
control the outcomes of the interaction, but in terms of the power to understand others.
In Study 2, the effect of asymmetric APK emerged even without mean differences between APK
and APPK. This latter nonsignificant effect may be attributable to the number of other group mem-
bers. In contrast to Study 1, which consisted entirely of dyads, Study 2 participants were perceived
by multiple others, which may have made it challenging for participants to conclude that they had
obtained more information about the collective than the collective had obtained about them. It
would be interesting for future research to experimentally manipulate the number of other group
members and more systematically examine how being perceived by multiple others influences expres-
sion of this bias. Nevertheless, Study 2 supported our central prediction that asymmetric APK is
associated with less egocentrism during a negotiation.
General Discussion
Two studies demonstrated that actors’ perceived knowledge about interaction partners (APK) relative to
their perceptions of their partners’ knowledge gained about the self (APPK) is associated with positive
interpersonal outcomes under conditions of uncertainty. Study 1 showed that when interacting with
strangers, higher relative APK to APPK (asymmetric APK) was associated with more positive partner
evaluations. Study 2 extended this finding by showing that when weighing self-interest against a higher-
order group goal in a negotiation, higher asymmetric APK was associated with lower egocentrism about
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what would be a fair distribution of resources. These findings collectively suggest that perceptions of
knowledge about others may reduce uncertainty during interactions and alleviate the belief that exploita-
tion could occur (assuming this knowledge is not negative), affording people perceptions of control over
their environments, even if such perceptions are not necessarily warranted (Langer, 1975; Thompson,
Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998).
Our findings may also speak to the functionality of the illusion of asymmetric insight, insofar as this
egocentric bias can have practical consequences for interpersonal relationships. Previous research has
uncovered how this bias is expressed, but not why it is expressed (Pronin et al., 2001, 2004). The present
findings build on prior research and suggest that this asymmetry may have its roots in the establishment
of interpersonal relationships, particularly among strangers and uncertain others.
The present studies are not without their limitations. First, the studies relied on correlation analy-
ses, raising the possibility of alternative causal sequences. For example, people who initially like one
another may communicate better, elevating both the perceptions of knowledge exchange and the
resulting group cooperation (Bouas & Komorita, 1996; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Dawes,
van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1990; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Kopelman et al., 2002; Weber et al.,
2004). Nevertheless, in both studies, we included the APMD to statistically account for the potentially
confounding influence of high mutual disclosure. Second, while the asymmetric insight favoring the
self reduces uncertainty about an imminent interaction in theory, the present studies did not assess
variables that may explain the asymmetry effect. It would be fruitful for future research to investigate
the role of potential mediating constructs such as trust, control, power, or empathy (Andreoni &
Rao, 2011; Galinsky et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 1998) that may further explain the asymmetry
effect. Third, we acknowledge the potential impact on the results of subtle interaction variables that
were not assessed in the present studies, including nonverbal behavior (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993;
Choi, Gray, & Ambady, 2005; Gilbert & Krull, 1988) and eye contact (Bond, Kahler, & Paolicelli,
1985; Iizuka, 1992). How they may relate to the significant effects of asymmetric APK offers a direc-
tion for future research.
A theoretically intriguing interpretation of our findings is that participants may have followed a logic
of appropriateness—what does a person like me (identity) do (rules) in a situation like this (recogni-
tion) given this culture (group)?—to inform the degree to which they thought it would be fair to
cooperate (Arora, Peterson, Krantz, Hardisty, & Reddy, 2012; Kopelman, 2009; March, 1994; Weber
et al., 2004). Specifically, it is possible that while interacting with others, they perceived their identity
(e.g., as more relational) or recognized the situation (e.g., benign, less threatening; long term vs. short
term) differently, prompting them to be less egocentric when facing a social dilemma. Specifically,
asymmetric APK may have prompted or afforded participants the capacity to view their identity, the
rules for resource distribution, the situation, or the anticipated group culture differently, although the
present studies did not measure these factors. Furthermore, we may not be able to generalize our find-
ings to interactions or relationships that extend over time, as our data included one-shot interactions.
The relation between actors’ knowledge perceptions and partner evaluation may plateau or possibly
even reverse with time (Norton, Frost, & Ariely, 2007). In a similar vein, over time, knowledge percep-
tion favoring the self may lead to overconfidence, which can be detrimental to relationships (e.g.,
Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002). Examining perceptions of knowledge
and how they may impact longer-term relationships and negotiations would be an interesting direction
for future research.
In summary, the present studies are consistent with the idea that asymmetric knowledge perceptions
shape evaluations of interaction partners and beliefs about fair resource distribution. Our findings help
elucidate the question of how people interact and make decisions during uncertain interactions. People
navigate a complex social world that necessitates interaction and negotiation with others, but the possi-
bility of exploitation persistently looms. To facilitate an uncertain interaction, people may generate the
belief, whether consciously or unconsciously, that they have an informational advantage over others.
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Insofar as this belief reduces social uncertainty, asymmetric perceptions of knowledge about others may
constitute adaptive cognitive tools that help people manage interactions, helping competitive dynamics
unfold cooperatively to attain better outcomes.
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